Gulf of Tonkin - A secret report reveals how easily soldiers, spies and politicians can jump to a conclusion and plunge the country into war. The intelligence community, including its SIGINT component, responded with a regional buildup to support the increase in U.S. operational forces. 313-314. That night and morning, while cruising in heavy weather, the ships received radar, radio, and sonar reports that signaled another North Vietnamese attack. The ships gunners used the standard 5 mil offset to avoid hitting the boats. Based on this, they launched the political process that led to the wars escalation. Quoted in Steve Edwards, "Stalking the Enemys Coast," U.S. The U.S. in-theater SIGINT assets were limited, as was the number of Vietnamese linguists. In the days leading up to the first incident of August 2nd, those secret operations had intensified.. WebUnderground Knowledge host James Morcan discloses what really happened in 1964's Gulf of Tonkin Incident which started the Vietnam War. . With this information, back in Washington President Johnson and his advisers considered their options. But we sure ought to always leave the impression that if you shoot at us, you're going to get hit, Johnson said. Seventh Fleet reduced it to 12 nautical miles. . The report covers all aspects of the efforts of the various American SIGINT agencies from the early postWorld War II years through the evacuation of Saigon. WebThe Gulf of Tonkin While Kennedy had at least the comforting illusion of progress in Vietnam (manufactured by Harkins and Diem), Johnson faced a starker picture of confusion, disunity, and muddle in Saigon and of a rapidly growing Viet Cong in the countryside. North Vietnams immediate concern was to determine the exact position and status of its torpedo boats and other forces. The Gulf of Tonkin Incident took place on Aug. 2 and 4, 1964, and helped lead to greater American involvement in the Vietnam War. Even in the darkness, the commandos could see their targeta water tower surrounded by a few military buildings. After the war, Hanoi officials not only acknowledged the event but deemed it important enough to designate its date, Aug. 2, as the Vietnamese Navy's Anniversary Day, "the day our heroic naval forces went out and chased away Maddox and Turner Joy." U.S. and South Vietnamese warships intruded into the territorial waters of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and simultaneously shelled: Hon Nieu Island, 4 kilometers off the coast of Thanh Hoa Province [and] Hon Me Island, 12 kilometers off the coast of Thanh Hoa Province." With that report, after nearly four decades, the NSA officially reversed its verdict on the events of August 4, 1964, that had led that night to President Lyndon Johnsons televised message to the nation: The initial attack on the destroyer Maddox, on August 2, was repeated today by a number of hostile vessels attacking two U.S. destroyers with torpedoes. Approved on Aug. 10, 1964, the Southeast Asia (Gulf of Tonkin) Resolution, gave Johnson the power to use military force in the region without requiring a declaration of war. As it turns out, Adm. Sharp failed to read to the Joint Chiefs the last line of the cable, whichread: Suggest a complete evaluation before any further actions.. What did and didnt happen in the Gulf of Tonkin on August 2 and 4 has long been in dispute, but the decisions that the Johnson Administration and Congress made based on an interpretation of those events were undeniably monumental. Incidentally, the first volume, Setting the Stage: To 1959, contains one of the best brief summaries I've read of Vietnam history from the end of World War II through the 1954 Geneva Conference. No actual visual sightings by Maddox.". The 522-page NSA official history Spartans in Darkness: American SIGINT and the Indochina War, 1945-1975, triggered a new round of media reporting and renewed debate about what really happened in the Gulf of Tonkin. 15. 14. Hanoi at the time denied all, leading to a third interpretation that remains alive today as what might be called the Stockdale thesis. This was almost certainly a reaction to the recent 34A raids. Keep supporting great journalism by turning off your ad blocker. This time the U.S. ships detected electronic signals and acoustic indications of a likely second North Vietnamese naval attack, and they requested U.S. air support. After suggesting a "complete evaluation" of the affair before taking further action, he radioed requesting a "thorough reconnaissance in daylight by aircraft." :: Douglas Pike, director of the Indochina Studies Program at the University of California-Berkeley, is the author of the forthcoming "Vietnam and the U.S.S.R.: Anatomy of an Alliance.". When the boats reached that point, Maddox fired three warning shots, but the torpedo boats continued inbound at high speed. The conspiracy theory has been dying for several years, and this work will probably be a stake through its heart. Whats not in dispute is the aftermath: A resolution from the Senate 2, pp. "Vietnam War: Gulf of Tonkin Incident." JCS, "34A Chronology of Events," (see Marolda and Fitzgerald, p. 424); Porter, Vietnam: The Definitive Documentation (Stanfordville, NY: 1979), vol. Both of these messages reached Washington shortly after 1400 hours EDT. Because the North Vietnamese had fewer than 50 Swatows, most of them up north near the important industrial port of Haiphong, the movement south of one-third of its fleet was strong evidence that 34A and the Desoto patrols were concerning Hanoi. These warning shots were fired and the P-4s launched a torpedo attack. Was the collapse of the Twin Towers on 911 terrorism are a controlled demolition. 9/11. PRX is a 501(c)(3) organization recognized by the IRS: #263347402. The boats followed at their maximum speed of 44 knots, continuing the chase for more than 20 minutes. A joint resolution of Congress dated August 7, 1964, gave the president authority to increase U.S. involvement in the war between North and South Vietnam and served as the legal basis for escalations in the Johnson and Nixon administrations that likely dwarfed what most Americans could have imagined in August 1964. Easily outdistancing the North Vietnamese boat, the commandos arrived back at Da Nang shortly after daybreak.8, North Vietnam immediately and publicly linked the 34A raids and the Desoto patrol, a move that threatened tentative peace feelers from Washington that were only just reaching Hanoi. By late 1958 it was obvious that a major Communist buildup was underway in South Vietnam, but the American SIGINT community was ill-placed and ill-equipped to deal with it. Vietnam is a very watery country. By then, the two American ships were approximately 80 nautical miles from the nearest North Vietnamese coastline and steaming southeast at 20 knots. In 1964 an Ohio woman took up the challenge that had led to Amelia Earharts disappearance. One 12.7mm machine bullet hit Maddox before the boats broke off and started to withdraw. Surprised by the North Vietnamese response, Johnson decided that the United States could not back away from the challenge and directed his commanders in the Pacific to continue with the Desoto missions. The Maddox planned to sail to 16 points along the North Vietnam coast, ranging from the DMZ north to the Chinese border. On 7 August, the Senate passed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, allowing the administration greater latitude in expanding the war by a vote of 88 to 2. Both South Vietnamese and U.S. maritime operators in Da Nang assumed that their raids were the cause of the mounting international crisis, and they never for a moment doubted that the North Vietnamese believed that the raids and the Desoto patrols were one and the same. Hickman, Kennedy. THIS SECOND volume of the U.S. Navy's multivolume history of the Vietnam War is bound in the same familiar rich blue buckram that has styled official Navy histories since the Civil War and hence resembles its predecessors. Typically, the missions were carried out by a destroyer specially outfitted with sensitive eavesdropping equipment. WebNational Security Agency/Central Security Service > Home 8. Through the evening of Aug. 4, while no new information arrivedto clarify the eventin the Gulf, the White House narrative was firmly in place. In July, General Westmoreland asked that Desoto patrols be expanded to cover 34A missions from Vinh Son north to the islands of Hon Me, Hon Nieu, and Hon Mat, all of which housed North Vietnamese radar installations or other coastwatching equipment. The Pyramid and All-Seeing Eye . The ships sonar operator reported a noise spikenot a torpedowhich the Combat Information Center (CIC) team mistook for report of an incoming torpedo. Forced Government Indoctrination Camps . By late July 1964, SOG had four Nasty-class patrol boats, designated. The only solution was to get rid of the evidence. Four boats, PTF-1, PTF-2 (the American-made patrol boats), PTF-5, and PTF-6 (Nasty boats), were on their way to bombard a North Vietnamese radar installation at Vinh Son and a security post on the banks of the nearby Ron River, both about 90 miles north of the DMZ. Neither ships crew knew about the North Vietnamese salvage operation. Gulf of Tonkin incident, complex naval event in the Gulf of Tonkin, off the coast of Vietnam, that was presented to the U.S. Congress on August 5, 1964, as two Forty-eight hours earlier, on Aug. 2, two US destroyers on patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin the Maddox and the Turner Joy were attacked by North Vietnamese boats. Mr. His assessment of the evidence now raised doubts in his mind about what really had happened. . The disclaimer is required, if for no other reason than because of Chapter 15, "The American Response to the Gulf of Tonkin Attacks," about which more later. The Johnson administration had made the first of several secret diplomatic attempts during the summer of 1964 to convince the North Vietnamese to stop its war on South Vietnam, using the chief Canadian delegate to the ICC, J. Blair Seaborn, to pass the message along to Hanoi. After the incident, Herrick was unsure that his ships had been attacked, reporting at 1:27 a.m. Washington time that "Freak weather effects on radar and overeager sonarmen may have accounted for many reports. NSA analysts from shore-based stations shared Herricks belief and transmitted an immediate warning to all major Pacific Theater commandsexcept to Herrick and Maddox. On the afternoon of Aug. 2, three Soviet-built P-4 motor torpedo boats were dispatched to attack the destroyer. Both sides, however, spent August 3 reviewing their contingency plans and analyzing lessons learned from the incident. At 1505, when the torpedo boats had closed within 10,000 yards, in accordance with Captain Herricks orders and as allowed under international law at that time, Maddox fired three warning shots. Over the next 12 hours, as the president's team scrambledto understand what hadhappened and to organize a response, the facts remained elusive. Listen to McNamara's conversation with Johnson. Hanoi denied the charge that it had fired on the U.S. destroyers on 4 August, calling the charge "an impudent fabrication. no isolated event. President Johnson himself apparently questioned the sailorsu0019 report of an attack. But Morse did not know enough about the program to ask pointed questions. (The recent NBC television movie In Love and War had Navy pilot James B. Stockdale flying over the scene at the time saying, "I see nothing"; now a retired vice admiral, Stockdale has reiterated the "phoney attack" charge in writings and public speaking.). Historians still argue about what exactly happened in the Gulf of Tonkin in August of 1964. Then, everyones doubts were swept away when a SIGINT intercept from one of the North Vietnamese torpedo boats reported the claim that it had shot down two American planes in the battle area. By including the orders and operational guidance provided to the units involved, the study develops the previously missing context of the intelligence and afteraction reports from the Gulf of Tonkin Incident. As a result, the ships offshore were able to collect valuable information on North Vietnamese military capabilities. Covert maritime operations were in full swing, and some of the missions succeeded in blowing up small installations along the coast, leading General Westmoreland to conclude that any close connection between 34A and Desoto would destroy the thin veneer of deniability surrounding the operations. And it didnt take much detective work to figure out where the commandos were stationed. While there was some doubt in Washington regarding the second attack, those aboard Maddox and Turner Joy were convinced that it had occurred. It is not NSA's intention to prove or Retrieved from https://www.thoughtco.com/vietnam-war-gulf-of-tonkin-incident-2361345. The Geneva Conference in 1954 was intended to settle outstanding issues following the end of hostilities between France and the Viet Minh at the end of the First Indochina War. Changing course in time to evade the torpedoes, the Maddox again was attacked, this time by a boat that fired another torpedo and 14.5-mm machine guns. "5, In reality there was little actual coordination between 34A and Desoto. WebCongress repealed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution before the United States' withdrawal from Vietnam in 1973. The Dollar Bill . Captain John J. Herrick, Commander Destroyer Division 192, embarked in the Maddox, concluded that there would be "possible hostile action." Westmoreland reported that although he was not absolutely certain why the Swatows were shifted south, the move "could be attributable to recent successful [34A] operations. The rounds set some of the buildings ablaze, keeping the defenders off balance. Or purchase a subscription for unlimited access to real news you can count on. . Ogier then opened fire at 1508 hours, when the boats were only six minutes from torpedo range. Suns and Stars In Saigon, Ambassador Maxwell Taylor objected to the halt, saying that "it is my conviction that we must resume these operations and continue their pressure on North Vietnam as soon as possible, leaving no impression that we or the South Vietnamese have been deterred from our operations because of the Tonkin Gulf incidents." Kennedy Hickman is a historian, museum director, and curator who specializes in military and naval history. The U.S. ships were supposed to remain well outside North Vietnams claimed five nautical mile territorial limit. Then North Vietnams naval authorities either became confused or were seized by indecision. Declassified NSA documents show that US intelligence members concealed relevant reports from Congress to push the narrative of a second attack. The USS Maddox in the Gulf of Tonkin is shown in 1963. Suddenly, North Vietnamese guns opened fire from the shore. The Gulf of Tonkin Incident famously gave the Johnson Administration the justification they needed to escalate the Vietnam War. While I was in training, my motivation was to get these wings and I wear them today proudly, the airman recalled in 2015. McNamara did not mention the 34A raids.15. On July 31, 1964, the destroyer USS Maddox commenced a Desoto patrol off North Vietnam. Like all intelligence, it must be analyzed and reported in context. Within days, Hanoi lodged a complaint with the International Control Commission (ICC), which had been established in 1954 to oversee the provisions of the Geneva Accords. Carl Otis Schuster, U.S. Navy (ret.) Although Washington officials did not believe Hanoi would attack the Desoto ships again, tensions ran high on both sides, and this affected their respective analyses of the events to come. Cookies collect information about your preferences and your devices and are used to make the site work as you expect it to, to understand how you interact with the site, and to show advertisements that are targeted to your interests. Here's why he couldn't walk away. It set a very terrible precedent, which is that he would go on to escalate further, not with any striking confidence that his objectives will be achieved, but only with the assurance that, unless he embarked on these massive military escalations, America would fail in Vietnam and he might well be labeled the only president in American history to lose a war.. Shortly after ordering the airstrikes, Johnson went on television and addressed the nation regarding the incident. Both the Phu Bai station and Maddoxs DSU knew the boats had orders to attack an enemy ship., Not knowing about the South Vietnamese commando raid, all assumed that Maddox was the target. Everything went smoothly until the early hours of 2 August, when intelligence picked up indications that the North Vietnamese Navy had moved additional Swatows into the vicinity of Hon Me and Hon Nieu Islands and ordered them to prepare for battle. (Hanoi remains muzzy on the second incident, Aug. 4, presumably since clearly it took place in international waters, the Vietnamese claim of "defensive reaction" is a bit wobbly.). In Saigon, General William C. Westmoreland, the new commander of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), approved of the plan, and SOG began testing 81-mm mortars, 4.5-inch rockets, and recoilless rifles aboard the boats. William Conrad Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War, Part II, 1961-1964, pp. The errors made in the initial analysis were due to a combination of inexperience, limited knowledge of North Vietnams operations and an operational imperative to ensure that the U.S. Navy ships would not be caught by surprise. Quoted in Steve Edwards, "Stalking the Enemys Coast," U.S. Hickman, Kennedy. Hisfirst ship was USS Glennon (DD-840), a FRAM I destroyer, thesame class as Maddox. It also outlined the Maddoxs path along the coast on 2 August and the 34A attacks on Vinh Son the following day. In less than 25 minutes, the attack was over. "I think we are kidding the world if you try to give the impression that when the South Vietnamese naval boats bombarded two islands a short distance off the coast of North Vietnam we were not implicated," he scornfully told McNamara during the hearings.16 Consequently, while Maddox was in the patrol area, a South Vietnamese commando raid was underway southwest of its position. In the summer of 1964, President Lyndon Baines Johnson needed a pretext to commit the American people to the already expanding covert war in South East Asia. The first critic report from Phu Bai reached Washington at about 0740 hours, Eastern Daylight Time (EDT). In truth, two of the torpedo boats were damaged, of which one could not make it back to port, while a single American aircraft sustained some wing damage. Unlike McNamara, Johnson, on the morning of Aug.4,1964, was in less of a hurry to respond to an attack. However, unlike the good old days when -- as the wizened cynical Frenchmen put it, history was a lie agreed-on -- no longer can governments after the battle simply set down how it went and that is that. Johnsonasked for, and received, a resolution of war from the US Congress that led to further escalation in the conflict. Originally begun by the Central Intelligence Agency in 1961, 34A was a highly-classified program of covert operations against North Vietnam. Background intelligence on North Vietnam, its radar networks and command-and-control systems was limited. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, Admiral Harry D. Felt, agreed and suggested that a U.S. Navy ship could be used to vector 34A boats to their targets.6. Then they boarded their boats and headed back to Da Nang.12 Both were perceived as threats, and both were in the same general area at about the same time. Shortly thereafter, the Phu Bai station intercepted the signal indicating the North Vietnamese intended to conduct a torpedo attack against the enemy. Phu Bai issued a Critic Reportshort for critical message, meaning one that had priority over all other traffic in the communications system to ensure immediate deliveryto all commands, including Maddox. Around midday on Aug. 4, Adm. Grant Sharp, the top navy commander in the Pacific, made a call to the Joint Chiefs, and it was clear there were significant doubts about this second incident. 17. The original radar contacts dropped off the scope at 2134, but the crews of Maddox and Turner Joy believed they detected two high-speed contacts closing on their position at 44 knots. Ticonderoga ordered four A-1H Skyraiders into the air to support the ships. Unlike much else that followed, this incident is undisputed, although no one from the US government ever admitted publicly that the attack was likely provoked by its covert actions. Taking evasive action, they fired on numerous radar targets. Few areas of the world have been as hotly contested as the India-Pakistan border. Subscribe to LBJ's War onApple Podcasts.
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